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THE REGRESS ARGUMENT IN KANT, 
WITTGENSTEIN, AND THE PITTSBURGH 
“PRAGMATISTS” 
JOSEPH MARGOLIS

 
Behind the argument that follows, I insert obliquely, in an informal and 
unsustained way, the hint of a legitimative rationale favoring 
―genealogical‖ readings over ―textualist‖ readings of certain philosophical 
statements: specifically, for present purposes, statements by Kant and 
―Kantians‖ of diverse stripes, some self-styled (aptly or not), some so 
interpreted by others, all bent on improving, dismissing, or displacing 
particular doctrines for cause. 
Genealogists, I take it, begin with the conviction that a philosophical 
problem of any importance is bound to be shared, however contentiously, 
by the authors and critics of compared texts. At their most inflexible, 
textualists tend to treat the work of the most seminal figures rather piously, 
so as to disallow anything but an entirely internalist critique (as in reading 
figures like Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Kant). My 
own sense is that extreme textualism impoverishes philosophy, and that 
sustained contemporary interest in the import of classic statements can 
rarely rely on purely textualist readings. 
Textualism seems to work quite well in, say, a quarrel reasonably 
pieced together between Leibniz and Kant (because Kant advances his 
own thesis with Leibniz in mind), but it rarely works between, say, Peter 
Strawson and Kant or Wilfrid Sellars or Robert Brandom and Kant; some 
concessions may be generously conceded to belong to the textualists’ 
model, for example, in Lewis White Beck’s comparison of Kant and 
Hume or Henry Allison’s comparison of Kant and Berkeley or Kant and 
Leibniz, or (even) Kant and Strawson or Paul Guyer.
1
 After all, even 
Kant’s ―internalist‖ critique of Leibniz’s relational account of space 
supposes that Kant and Leibniz share a public or ―external‖ problem that 
they approach from textually very different vantages: each must be read as 
addressing the pertinent claims the other poses regarding the world they 
share or how we think or must think about such claims.
2
 So there is 
 
 
  Joseph Margolis, Laura H. Carnell Professor of Philosophy, Temple University. 
 1. See P.F. STRAWSON, THE BOUNDS OF SENSE: AN ESSAY ON KANT’S CRITIQUE OF PURE 
REASON (1966). 
 2. Here, I’ve benefited more than I can say from a very instructive conversation with, and my 
reading of a paper by, Professor Manfred Baum (University of Wuppertal). See Manfred Baum, 
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something of a continuum of exchange between textualist and 
genealogical dispute; nevertheless, as we approach our own time, debates 
of this sort are less and less content to restrict matters in a way that favors 
textualist treatments over genealogical ones. 
I concede that we may be fairly drawn to the textualist’s practice—
piecemeal. But I cannot see that such a picture is at all suitable in a close 
study of Kant’s arguments (or Aristotle’s, for that matter) if Kant is (as he 
surely is) the single most important figure in the ―modern modern 
tradition‖ running continuously (and legibly) in the genealogical way from 
the mid-eighteenth century to our own day. I don’t deny that that may be 
disputed, but it’s a losing gamble. To find our principal questions bruited 
in Kant ineluctably favors the genealogical over the textualist temper. This 
may explain why, despite there being very little stomach for enshrining 
Hegel’s conceptual ―system‖ in the textualists’ way, many readers (I 
include myself) are very much taken with Hegel’s genealogical exposé of 
Kant’s essential failure to meet (that is, to have met) Hegel’s best 
challenge to his transcendentalism. Very few would now be willing to 
treat the validity of Kant’s apriorism in the textualists’ way (say, against 
Leibniz); the validation of any part of Kant’s epistemology surely requires 
a genealogical slant. That is indeed the bias of the argument that follows—
which bias I take to be essential to the pragmatist turn. 
Transcendentalism, let me say, has the gravest difficulty distinguishing 
between genuine synthetic a priori truths and projections from 
experientially promising constraints that our conceptual imagination, on 
such occasions, finds impossible to outstrip or defeat, so that, as with 
conceiving a non-Euclidean geometry for the first time, we find ourselves 
forced to turn with a new regard to historical invention and discovery. We 
begin to glimpse a convergence between a proto-Critical Hume and a post-
empiricist Kant. 
I 
It sometimes happens, in contemporary physics, that very complicated, 
expensive, unbelievably lengthy subatomic experiments of strategic but 
less than decisive importance simply fail to yield any positive results at all. 
The scientists who guessed wrong nevertheless come together to share the 
lesser glory of publishing their failure as a statement of orderly record—
and they’re right to do so. Philosophy, by contrast, is not an experimental 
 
 
Objects and Objectivity in Kant’s First Critique, in KANT’S IDEALISM: NEW INTERPRETATIONS OF A 
CONTROVERSIAL DOCTRINE 55, 55–70 (Dennis Schulting & Jacco Verburgt eds., 2011). 
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science, though one hears, of course, of thought experiments frequently 
enough. Philosophy’s history is cluttered with such successful failures: 
first, because conceivability is often all that’s wanted, and, second, 
because failure even there can serve as a provocation for another try, under 
the condition of infinite revisability. 
Kant, it will be remembered, broached a version of the well-known 
regress argument in the first and third Critiques. What’s noteworthy about 
Kant’s mention of the matter—if it’s noteworthy at all—is that he was not 
in the least troubled by its fabled importance: he brushed the regress off as 
a sort of conceptual gnat, and he was quite right to do so. The trouble (I 
must say, however thanklessly) is that Kant gained the right to dismiss the 
regress threat through the presumptive privilege of his transcendentalism: 
deprived of that, the regress argument might easily have been recovered as 
a matter of some importance, as, in our own time, it has been by 
Wittgenstein, by Wilfrid Sellars, and by Robert Brandom, all of whom 
(including Kant) are said by Brandom to have been ―Kantians‖ and 
―pragmatists‖ of a recognizable sort. The oddity is that the four of them 
viewed the regress problem in very different ways: Kant couldn’t have 
taken the problem seriously if he had viewed it (as indeed he did) from his 
apriorist position, and he couldn’t have been a Kantian in Brandom’s 
sense; Wittgenstein dismisses the regress argument (in any sense close to 
Kant’s) in a way (for cause) that, rightly read, would apply decisively 
against the ―Kantian‖ cast of Sellars’s and Brandom’s solutions; and 
neither Sellars nor Brandom actually provides a pertinently arguable form 
of the regress claim, or any clue to support Brandom’s conjecture that they 
are committed to the same sort of solution. Disaster all around, you might 
say. 
I find myself in the unenviable position of reporting disappointment 
with all three of the sanguine thought experiments I’ve mentioned: Kant’s, 
Sellars’s, and Brandom’s; also, with the problematically positive import of 
Wittgenstein’s seemingly negative finding; the sizable mistake of thinking 
that any of the four were actually ―Kantians‖ of Brandom’s sort; and the 
sheer awkwardness of claiming to discern the undeniable thread of 
―Kantian‖ continuity running from Kant himself to Brandom, by way of 
an issue (the regress argument) that effectively requires the abandonment 
of apriorism (the very basis on which Kant rightly dismisses the regress 
argument’s slim importance). 
The regress issue must be read loosely enough to permit Brandom to 
apply his misleading labels ―Kantian‖ and ―pragmatist‖ to Gottlob Frege, 
who could not possibly have endorsed Kant’s transcendentalism and who 
would have dismissed the regress argument flat-out if (being a platonist of 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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sorts) he’d considered it at all. But Frege is needed (opportunistically) to 
bring Sellars and Brandom on board—though there’s no gain to be had in 
the maneuver since neither Sellars nor Brandom succeeds in making the 
regress issue worth the bother. In fact, their treatment of it does no more 
than pave the way for replacing the usual textual scruple of addressing 
Kant’s problems in his own terms, favoring instead what I call a 
―genealogical‖ alternative—an effort I support in principle but would need 
to assess case by case in practice—that tolerates inventive conjectures 
about how to salvage options suggested by Kant’s texts that Kant himself 
would never endorse: as famously, and at some cost, undertaken in the so-
called ―subtractive‖ strategy of P.F. Strawson.3 
That’s the best I can do with deflecting your instant rejection of 
Brandom’s strategy. Except that, in my opinion, it’s becoming 
increasingly doubtful that textualist readings of Kant, unyieldingly 
opposed to fresh genealogies, can expect to claim (indefinitely) to be 
worth the bother: think, for instance, of Henry Allison’s honorable but 
unsuccessful reading of Kant alongside Allison’s fair critique of 
Strawson.
4
 Or, consider the challenge of Brandom’s inferentialism, which 
may be the single most debated, recent, self-styled ―Kantian‖ effort at 
redirecting the largest energies of Anglo-American and European 
philosophy along rather unexpected lines. Brandom’s challenge has, willy-
nilly, given a new sort of energy to the regress argument and, I should add, 
to related arguments—for instance, to something like a drastically 
simplified ―completeness‖ argument. Brandom, you realize, speaks of his 
program as involving a sort of ―semantic logicism,‖5 which obliges us to 
reckon with it, which takes precedence over merely textual matters, and 
which cannot be dealt with without turning genealogical. Of course, it’s 
the sheer daring of Kant’s apriorism that draws us to genealogical liberties 
to save some version of transcendental analysis from Kant’s own excesses. 
It’s worth mentioning, for the record, that the truest ―Kantian‖ of the 
new breed that includes Sellars and Brandom is undoubtedly John 
McDowell, who proceeds genealogically as well, but very sparely, and 
who is openly Wittgensteinian in explicating the meaning of ―following a 
rule‖ (in the sense in which Wittgenstein is himself effectively occupied 
with dismantling Kant’s apriorism), the very premise that introduces and 
ultimately neutralizes the thrust of the regress argument. McDowell never 
 
 
 3. See STRAWSON, supra note 1. 
 4. See generally HENRY E. ALLISON, KANT’S TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM (2004). 
 5. See ROBERT B. BRANDOM, BETWEEN SAYING AND DOING: TOWARDS AN ANALYTIC 
PRAGMATISM 27–30 (2008) [hereinafter BRANDOM, SAYING AND DOING]. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol6/iss1/8
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directly engages the regress argument (as far as I know), though, more by 
genealogical than by textualist means, he favors important parts of Kant’s 
treatment of realism and normativity (whether he converges or diverges 
with or from Sellars or Brandom). 
Once we begin to argue genealogically, however, the difference 
between Kantian and anti-Kantian philosophical maneuvers becomes quite 
difficult to define. McDowell treats the problem of ―following a rule‖ (a 
fundamental Kantian issue if there ever was one), as directly bearing, 
according to his reading of Wittgenstein, on the import and right analysis 
of the realism question (which, of course, is another essential Kantian 
issue). But you cannot fail to see that, in following Wittgenstein on rules, 
McDowell is effectively obliged to discard Kant’s transcendentalism (but 
would otherwise have had to address the regress problem); he might also 
then have drawn from the fate of transcendentalism important clues about 
the right analysis of judgments about the world (that is, ―rule-following‖ 
as read in Wittgenstein’s terms). You begin to see the sense in which 
McDowell (not unlike Brandom and not unlike Richard Rorty) finds a 
residual realism that Kant and Wittgenstein may be said to share that does 
not depend on Kant’s apriorism. Here, McDowell explicitly speaks of 
―transcendental empiricism.‖6 
All this contrives new forms of ―Kantian‖ thinking that must find laxer 
ways of drawing on textual materials in Kant than would normally be 
 
 
 6. See JOHN MCDOWELL, Wittgenstein on Following a Rule, in MIND, VALUE, AND REALITY 
221, 254–55 (1998). See also JOHN MCDOWELL, Experiencing the World, in JOHN MCDOWELL: 
REASON AND NATURE, (Marcus Willaschek ed., 2000); JOHN MCDOWELL, MIND AND WORLD (1994); 
RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979). I have, I should add, deliberately 
not mentioned McDowell’s Woodbridge Lectures (1997), which afford the most sustained impression 
of McDowell’s attraction to Kant. See John McDowell, Lecture I: Sellars on Perceptual Experience, 
95 J. PHIL. 431–50 (1998); John McDowell, Lecture II: The Logical Form of an Intuition, 95 J. PHIL. 
451–70 (1998); John McDowell, Lecture III: Intentionality as a Relation, J. PHIL. 471–91 (1998) 
[hereinafter McDowell, Lectures]. But a careful reading shows unmistakably that McDowell is 
primarily interested in Sellars’s ―Kantian‖ treatment of perception vis-à-vis the ―transcendental‖ (but 
not transcendentalist) treatment of the realism issue. In fact, I venture to say (and trust I’m reporting 
the matter fairly when I say) that McDowell is primarily interested in Sellars’s reliance on the 
―receptivity‖ or ―passivity‖ of initially acquiring the sensory content of perception, in his (Sellars’s) 
reading of the transcendental conditions of Kant’s account of perceptual content. I think this 
adequately explains why McDowell does not address Kant’s treatment of the regress issue (which 
surfaces in a distinctive way in Sellars’s EMPIRICISM AND PHILOSOPHY OF MIND, the principal site of 
the analysis offered in the Woodbridge Lectures themselves). See SELLARS, EMPIRICISM, infra note 9. 
I think I’m right that Brandom’s ―Study Guide‖ to Sellars’s paper does not address the regress issue 
either. See id. I’m inclined to think that McDowell sees Brandom’s use of the regress material (in 
MAKING IT EXPLICIT) as a somewhat fruitless diversion. (I have no evidence for this conjecture.) 
Effectively, the three lectures explain very thoroughly indeed just where McDowell follows, and 
departs from, Sellars, as well what McDowell means by his own ―transcendental empiricism.‖ See 
McDowell, Lectures, supra. 
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favored. I cannot see how the temptation can be successfully opposed—or 
why it should be. It doesn’t surprise me at all that arguments that tend to 
show that ―just about everyone‖ is a pragmatist tend to be matched by 
arguments that show that just about everyone is a Kantian. We already 
have it, from Hilary Putnam, that in asking whether Wittgenstein was a 
pragmatist, he might (as he concedes) as easily have asked whether 
Wittgenstein was a neo-Kantian.
7
 Of course. The convergence is already 
implicit in comparing Charles Peirce and Ernst Cassirer with regard to the 
openendedness of inquiry. The fact is, the regress argument enters Kant’s 
Critiques rather quietly, but it has been energetically recovered as a result 
of Brandom’s choosing to introduce his inferentialism (in Making It 
Explicit
8
) as, in its own way, a Kantian-inspired solution to what he takes 
to have become of Kant’s regress problem interpreted to suit his own 
reading of Wittgenstein’s remarkably influential analysis of what it is to 
―follow a rule.‖ Extraordinary zigzag! A good deal of Brandom’s 
genealogy is, frankly, fiction; but the new form of the controversy is 
certainly not fiction. 
The curious thing is that both Brandom’s program (very possibly the 
single most widely debated philosophical proposal now in the analytic 
lists—also possibly, then, beyond those boundaries) and Kant’s 
transcendental vision (after the deep innovation of the third Critique) are 
placed at mortal risk in a fresh way that may begin to define the future 
promise of Western philosophy itself. I can well believe that there’s more 
than a hint of insuperable failure (not unfamiliar in Kant’s case and 
somewhat early it may seem in Brandom’s, without claiming any parity in 
their respective contributions), which signifies our approaching as near as 
we have ever been to the actual close of the immense interval spanning 
Kant’s original triumph and the last energies of the linguistic turn. So 
Brandom’s genealogical fiction has its own unforeseen ironic lesson to 
bestow. 
I find the prospect miniaturized in the revival of the regress argument, 
otherwise eccentrically linked to some of the more strategic contests of our 
day. More than that, I fancy that the grand defect of the third Critique is 
rendered almost impossible to discount, by retracing the frailties of the 
regress matter back to Kant by way of Brandom’s unquestionably clever 
genealogy. I trust you will be patient with the reconstructed argument: the 
 
 
 7. HILARY PUTNAM, PRAGMATISM: AN OPEN QUESTION 27 (1995). 
 8. See ROBERT B. BRANDOM, MAKING IT EXPLICIT: REASONING, REPRESENTING, AND 
DISCURSIVE COMMITMENT (1994) [hereinafter BRANDOM, MAKING IT EXPLICIT]. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol6/iss1/8
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verdict on Kant insists on making its appearance only at the very end of 
the story. 
II 
I’m drawn to the regress problem in Kant in good part because Kant is 
obviously untroubled by its presence in his account of the faculty or power 
of judgment. I’m also drawn to the regress problem because Wittgenstein 
(who appears to be addressing an evidentiarily construed version of Kant’s 
account of rules) simply ―dismantles‖ the Kantian-like answer and, with it, 
the original problem. Brandom (interpreting Sellars) believes he’s 
resurrected the regress problem in the evidentiary spirit Wittgenstein 
favors, which extends the supposed ―pragmatist intent‖ of Kant’s original 
treatment of the regress issue—which ―thereby‖ restores, in turn, the true 
force and relevance of Kant’s original regress question—for later 
―Kantians‖ like Sellars and Brandom himself, who are no longer apriorists 
but who respect the evidentiary form of the Kantian question. Neither 
Sellars nor Brandom, it should be noted, addresses the regress problem in 
Kant’s transcendentalist way: they reject Kant’s apriorism, Sellars 
sketches his sense of the sort of condition that might relieve us of the 
regress worry (which broaches a deeper question that goes beyond our 
terms of reference here), and Brandom introduces a completely artifactual 
makeshift (presumably advancing Sellars’s resolution, which is more than 
doubtful), which he believes provides a satisfactory answer to Kant and 
Wittgenstein and Sellars (all in the spirit of Frege’s ―pragmatism‖). 
Finally, I’m drawn to the problem because none of this seems to me to 
make much sense at all in the terms given.
9
 
 
 
 9. Sellars does indeed pursue a different line of speculation regarding the regress argument 
developed from the conjecture of the 1949 paper Language, Rules and Behavior, infra note 21—which 
Brandom favors—in the more important 1956 Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind paper (which 
John McDowell favors, though he does not appear to concern himself with the regress issue in 
Sellars’s text). The essay has been reissued in WILFRID SELLARS, EMPIRICISM AND THE PHILOSOPHY 
OF MIND (1997) [hereinafter SELLARS, EMPIRICISM], with an Introduction by Richard Rorty and a 
Study Guide by Robert Brandom. In the Empiricism paper, the regress issue is inseparable from 
Sellars’s attempt to construe a ―Kantian‖ (but not an apriorist) account of the conditions of perceptual 
(or empirical) realism. The larger theme has been reworked by McDowell as a (Sellarsian-inspired) 
form of what McDowell names ―transcendental empiricism.‖ Brandom’s Study Guide of the 
EMPIRICISM piece shows very clearly that he reads Sellars in quite a different way from McDowell’s 
treatment. I anticipate exploring McDowell’s argument in some depth in another essay: the regress 
issue is not the best vehicle for examining the realism question in McDowell, or in pragmatism and 
analytic philosophy in general. Brandom does appear to have been influenced by McDowell’s reading 
of Sellars’s Empiricism piece. But his solution of the regress problem very definitely depends on his 
reading of Wittgenstein and the Sellars of the Language, Rules and Behavior paper, infra note 21. 
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Brandom supposes that Kant’s apriorism is an extravagance or wrong 
turn that can be abandoned without abandoning the idea of judgment’s 
disciplinary rules; that Frege’s logicism is more pragmatist than platonist; 
that Wittgenstein is right about the pragmatic analysis of discourse vis-à-
vis inferentialism and Kant’s treatment of the regress problem (once 
apriorist presumptions are set aside); that Wittgenstein is mistaken about 
the ―right‖ way to dismantle the regress problem; that Sellars correctly 
glimpses the source of the paradox’s resolution but leaves the issue 
inadequately resolved; and that he (Brandom) has now rethreaded the 
nerve of the entire tradition that runs from Kant, through Frege, through 
Wittgenstein, through Sellars, through the development of the resources of 
modern logic, to the algorithmic powers of AI-simulation, which can be 
adjusted pretty well as we please in order to capture the inferentially 
freighted uses to which discourse is standardly put. Voilà! I take the 
argument to have failed to meet its own requirements.
10
 But, here and now, 
I mean only to trace the vagaries of the regress issue itself. It’s in this 
limited sense that I intend my report of a rather massive philosophical 
failure to exhibit some of the redeeming features of the physicists’ 
severely negative reports of their own failed work.  
In any event, I think it is safe to say—viewing the work of my gang of 
four (Kant, Wittgenstein, Sellars, Brandom) and leaving McDowell aside 
for the time being (since, on the issue before us, McDowell, apart from his 
own expository skill, pretty well repeats Wittgenstein’s ―answer‖ to Kant 
in the manner of Stanley Cavell’s reading of rule-following)—that we 
already have four very different accounts of the regress issue (all deemed 
―Kantian‖). But I’ve also suggested that since the regress issue is itself 
inseparable from that of the analysis of rules, it’s not surprising that 
McDowell’s genealogical use of Kant’s treatment of the understanding 
generates its own problematic interpretation of Kant’s texts (regarding 
realism, or even regarding meaning, truth, and naturalism). This 
interpretation, then, affects an assessment of McDowell’s reading of 
Sellars’s reading of Kant—hence, of McDowell’s ―transcendental‖ 
treatment of perceptual realism. 
McDowell, I would say, is closer to Kant than Brandom is. But he is 
also closer to Wittgenstein than Brandom is. I find that McDowell is also 
 
 
Since McDowell does not engage the regress question, it seems reasonable to postpone addressing his 
very different position for the sake of a more accommodating entry. 
 10. I provide a version of the counterargument in my paper Joseph Margolis, Beyond Brandom’s 
Pragmatism at the First European Pragmatist Conference, Rome, Italy (Sept. 19–21, 2012), available 
at http://www.nordprag.org/papers/epc1/Margolis.pdf. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol6/iss1/8
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closer to Sellars than Brandom is; hence, that he and Brandom have very 
different views. As it happens, McDowell has no need to repeat Kant’s 
answer to the regress issue, or Wittgenstein’s answer; he’s not likely to 
have felt obliged to take a stand on Brandom’s view of the matter. 
McDowell is drawn to Sellars’s ―Kantian‖ treatment of perception in the 
latter’s Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, where Sellars actually airs 
the regress question in ―empiricist‖ and ―rationalist‖ terms—in a spirit 
very different from that in which he engages the regress question in his 
earlier papers (which Brandom draws on).
11
 It’s entirely possible that 
since, in his reading of the Empiricism paper, McDowell gains an 
important clue to a potentially powerful defense of a ―transcendental‖ 
approach to the realism question—a clue he finally casts as a form of 
―transcendental empiricism‖ (McDowell’s term)—he may have decided to 
save his argumentative powder for a better cause. In any case, McDowell’s 
issues require an entirely different approach.
12
 
The regress problem is now an industry often (exaggeratedly) regarded 
as a Kantian industry. Wittgenstein and the others, now including 
McDowell, Sellars, and Brandom (a trio simplistically collected as the 
―Pittsburgh pragmatists‖ or the ―Pittsburgh School‖), and Kant himself (if 
you allow the joke) are said to be ―Kantians‖ in the arch sense of that 
philosophical shorthand that merely emphasizes that Kant was indeed the 
decisive figure who, countering Hume’s too tepid transcendental instincts, 
magisterially entrenched the principal distinction between the descriptive 
and the normative in every quarter of human understanding and reason. 
The others mentioned are automatically deemed to have championed the 
same, or much the same, distinctions. But that cannot be right, whatever 
overlap may be conceded. 
One hears something of the sort casually but inaccurately bruited in the 
spirit that belongs to the efforts to ―re-enchant‖ the world, going well 
beyond the times and fears of Max Weber’s reporting the so-called 
―disenchantment‖ of the world—as in McDowell’s urging an ineluctable 
conceptual need to readmit normativity, necessity, intentionality, and 
rationality at whatever level of analysis we admit the cognizing role of 
subjective agents, where ―subjective‖ is not construed psychologically. 
This seems to me to move too quickly (on McDowell’s part) as it fails to 
address the principled relationship between Kantian causality and Kantian 
freedom, the laws of nature and the rules of reason, or the theory of the 
 
 
 11. See SELLARS, supra note 9. 
 12. See MCDOWELL, supra note 6.  
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human self itself, which, in my opinion, Kant (not unlike Hume) very 
nearly neglects. 
All of this is put instantly at considerable risk by the seemingly 
reasonable attempt to answer or dissolve ―the regress question.‖ One sees 
this at once when one adds (on Brandom’s initiative) the name of another 
would-be ―Kantian,‖ Gottlob Frege, who admits in the strongest possible 
way the essential kinship between logic and ethics, and is a figure who 
(like Kant) influenced Wittgenstein and the Pittsburgh philosophers and 
pertinent others (Saul Kripke, Rorty, Putnam, and Michael Dummett, say) 
but in ways that cannot possibly mark them as Kantians. ―Like ethics,‖ 
Frege observes, ―logic can also be called a normative science.‖13 But what 
does Frege mean by that? Surely not what Kant meant and not what Peirce 
meant—and not what Brandom means. Frege, I presume, has nothing to 
say about the reenchantment theme; he could not possibly be satisfied with 
Kant’s transcendental strategy (for instance, applied to arithmetic), and he 
has no particular interest in the regress argument. The double idea that 
Frege continued Kant’s distinction and was in a way a pragmatist as well 
is, I must say, no more than a fantasy on Brandom’s part. Similarities 
between Kant and Frege are essentially coincidental and almost always 
misleading. Of course, if normativity were read in Kant’s 
transcendental(ist) way, the regress argument itself would dwindle to a 
mere nuisance. I should add, as a sudden thought, that it’s not at all easy to 
make the case that the normativity of the ethical and of the logical are in 
principle similar. I don’t believe they are. I take the difference to signal the 
incompletely resolved problems—different problems—confronting 
Sellars, Brandom, and McDowell. 
III 
The use of the epithet, ―Kantian,‖ is certainly in good part due to 
Richard Rorty’s gentle influence and Robert Brandom’s ready ear. Let me, 
therefore, offer a few specimen remarks from Brandom’s genealogy of the 
regress problem, in his Making It Explicit, which suggests a potentially 
good use of what, otherwise, may be too quick a liberty: 
Kant’s lesson [Brandom remarks] is taken over as a central theme 
by Frege, whose campaign against psychologism relies on 
 
 
 13. Cited by Brandom, from a longish, previously unpublished fragment of one of Frege’s 
essays, titled Logic (1897), now included in GOTTLOB FREGE, POSTHUMOUS WRITINGS 126, 128 
(Hans Hermes et al. eds., Peter Long & Roger White trans., 1979). 
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respecting and enforcing the distinction between the normative 
significance of applying concepts and the causal consequences of 
doing so;
14
 
Another thinker who, like Wittgenstein, takes his starting point from 
Kant’s and Frege’s appreciation of the normative character of 
intentionality (for him, coeval with language use) is Wilfrid Sellars 
. . . . Like Wittgenstein, Sellars sees that an adequate conception of 
[the] norms [for using language correctly] must move beyond the 
pervasive regularist tradition, which can understand them only in 
the form of [explicit] rules;
15
 
and, finally, 
What Wittgenstein shows [—―the lesson Wittgenstein has to teach 
Kant,‖ to which Brandom adds: Kant already ―appreciates the point 
that Wittgenstein is making‖—] is that the intellectualist model [the 
propositionally explicit model, presumably Kant’s] will not do as an 
account of the nature of the normative as such. For when applied to 
the norms governing the application of rules and principles, it 
generates a regress, which can be halted only by acknowledging the 
existence of some more primitive form of norm [which Brandom 
calls ―pragmatist,‖ by way of another liberty].16 
Here you have the most succinct clues possible regarding the general 
reading of the regress problem (and of other aspects of normativity and 
intentionality) that belongs to what is now widely viewed as the ―Kantian‖ 
thrust of ―Pittsburgh pragmatism,‖ much too influential at the moment to 
be scanted or ignored for merely verbal or textual reasons. In fact, though 
it would take us too far from my present concern to extend the list of those 
affected by this development, the list of the kind of ―Kantians‖ being 
featured here—favoring normativity’s proper place in the vocabulary of 
our day, much more than the resolution of the regress problem—could 
very reasonably be extended to include such figures as Charles Peirce 
(who may very possibly have had an inkling of Frege’s view of 
normativity and who implicitly outflanks the regress problem by his own 
―long run‖ argument), signaling his indifference to any opportunistic mate 
of what Max Weber calls ―Occidental rationalism,‖ a soulless, purely 
 
 
 14. BRANDOM, MAKING IT EXPLICIT, supra note 8, at 11. 
 15. Id. at 33–34. 
 16. Id. at 23 n.31. I’ve taken some liberties with the third citation, in order to bring it into accord 
with the other two; but the wording, except where indicated, is entirely Brandom’s. 
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exploitative, instrumentalist reading of reason gaining ground through the 
entire sweep of capitalism. (Something of this last concern appears in 
McDowell.) But what’s needed in the accounts of the ―Pittsburgh 
Kantians‖ are the fully formed alternatives (on issues like normativity and 
realism) to replace what they can no longer subscribe to, having rejected 
Kant’s transcendentalism. 
I risk mentioning this sort of issue within the bounds of the regress 
theme because we learn thereby that its resolution (such as it is) always 
depends on more than any merely formal or methodological 
considerations. It may in fact be resolved by invoking one or another sort 
of the normatively informed privilege of the faculty of understanding: in 
Kant, though not compellingly (as far as I’m concerned), by the use of 
apriorist powers; more interestingly, in the context of legal questions 
threatened by an evidentiary sort of regress, by the simple device of that 
enactive instrument we call a judge’s or jury’s ―verdict‖—which overrides 
the regress of mere judgments. 
For Kant, the regress issue is, finally, a matter of stupidity. In the law, 
outside of philosophy, the regress problem is normally resolved with an 
eye to limited resources and practical necessity; it has little bearing on the 
philosophical question. Genealogically, Wittgenstein is the implacable 
opponent of Kant’s apriorism. McDowell is essentially a Wittgensteinian 
on the analysis of rules, but he does not follow Wittgenstein on other 
related issues—he follows Kant, or Sellars’s Kant, or his own ―correction‖ 
of Sellars’s Kant—who may be Kant no more. Brandom effectively 
abandons the regress issue after giving reasons to believe he thinks he’s 
solved the puzzle along Sellarsian lines; but he nowhere spells out the 
argument. I see no evidence that Sellars could possibly agree with Kant’s 
apriorism, and Brandom cannot afford to agree with either Kant or 
Wittgenstein (or Frege, for that matter). 
My own view, read in the simplest way, is that the regress problem is 
little more than a benign form of skepticism: it cannot be solved, read in 
the theorizing spirit in which it’s posed. But it can be borne lightly enough 
as the honest consequence of abandoning every form of foundationalism 
and cognitive privilege (without abandoning confidence or certainty 
wherever, in the course of practical life, the degree of assurance we can 
muster is sufficient to offset the seeming skepticism that looms). 
Skepticism could never be Kant’s nemesis, or Wittgenstein’s—it’s no 
more than the verso of our abandonment of unconditional argument. 
Kant’s weakness rests, rather, with our doubts about his ever having 
satisfactorily drafted compelling grounds for the apriorist assurance he 
tenders—on which (if conceded) the force of the regress argument 
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dwindles to zero. It’s Kant’s own failure that confirms the regress 
problem’s special life. Wherever realism is firmest evidentiarily, so also is 
the regress argument, which we read as skepticism. In that sense, 
Wittgenstein never defeats skepticism, and never needs to. The argument 
of the Investigations dismantles Kant’s picture of the occasion for its 
routine appearance: it becomes inconsequential, as our crisp claims in 
favor of propositional certainty retreat in the face of Wittgenstein’s 
opening exercises (Brandom’s inferentialism, for one.17 Wittgenstein gives 
us reason to believe that the threat of evidentiary regress is stalemated by 
the need for practical responses, in a manner not at all dissimilar to the 
function of the verdicts of a court of law, now cast more laxly and 
informally in terms of the apt competence of the members of societies that 
share a form of life and its usual language games. 
Here, Brandom is on both sides of the ―pragmatist’s‖ fence: in the 
name of inferentialism, he embraces Wittgenstein’s proposal to replace the 
analysis of verbal meaning by the analysis of the discursive ―use‖ of 
language, in ―doing‖ whatever we do linguistically; but, in support of his 
inferentialist paradigm, Brandom unconditionally rejects Wittgenstein’s 
exemplary language games (meant to explain what we ―do‖) as betraying 
inferentialism itself!
18
 No satisfactory argument is ever given; the textual 
treatment is completely perfunctory. Nevertheless, Brandom’s intended 
argument remains in its way decisive. You must bear in mind that 
Brandom construes his own brief as utterly loyal to Kant’s deepest 
intention regarding the regress threat, though he (Brandom) is hardly 
tempted to defend any apriorist strategy. I’ve already signaled that Kant 
divides the question between its apriorist and empirical application and 
that, as a consequence, no serious regress ever arises, as far as Kant is 
concerned. Frege’s confidence in logicism may be a fair analogue of 
Kant’s transcendental assurance, but the two conceptions play entirely 
different roles. Brandom, of course, is loyal to Sellars’s ―Kantianism,‖ but 
not to Kant’s apriorism. As a result, under the pressure of his own attempt 
to mount an all-purpose argument, Brandom finds Sellars’s incipient 
inferentialism (which claims to be inspired by Kant and which Brandom is 
set to ―complete‖ in Sellars’s Kantian manner), implicitly—splendidly—
championed, in the Investigations, in Wittgenstein’s well-known analysis 
of ―rules.‖19 Even here, however, Brandom misreads Wittgenstein’s 
 
 
 17. See BRANDOM, MAKING IT EXPLICIT, supra note 14. 
 18. See BRANDOM, SAYING AND DOING, supra note 5. 
 19. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 219, at 85e (G.E.M. 
Anscombe trans., 1963). 
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instruction: Wittgenstein’s treatment of the regress problem cannot be 
separated from his larger account of language and language games. 
I’m convinced that Sellars reads Kant ―genealogically‖ (in the sense 
already supplied): Sellars is certainly aware that his notion of ―material 
inference‖ entails the abandonment of Kant’s apriorism. In effect, Sellars 
means to displace Kant’s apriorist certainty about the right application of 
the rules of judgment bearing on actual perception and experience—
disarming the very point of Kant’s ―stupidity‖ charge and (somehow) 
encouraging Brandom’s innovation. Here, the ―textualist‖ and 
―genealogical‖ readings of Kant are in clear conflict. In addition, 
Brandom’s solution is never made explicit. 
If you have all this in view, you cannot fail to see the significance 
(―Kantian,‖ ―Sellarsian,‖ and ―Wittgensteinian‖) in the following rather 
brilliantly concocted summary Brandom ventures in the opening chapter 
of Making It Explicit: 
If correctnesses of performance are determined by rules only against 
the background of correctnesses of application of the rule, how are 
these latter correctnesses to be understood? If the regulist 
understanding of all norms as rules is right, then applications of a 
rule should themselves be understood as correct insofar as they 
accord with some further rule . . . . The question of the autonomy of 
the intellectualist conception of norms, presupposed by the claim 
that rules are the form of the normative, is the question of whether 
the normative can be understood as ―rules all the way down,‖ or 
whether rulish properties depend on some more primitive sort of 
practical propriety. Wittgenstein argues that the latter is the case.
20
 
I cannot imagine a cleverer summary to put Brandom’s would-be solution 
of the regress problem in the best ―Kantian‖ light. First of all, it shows 
how to commit Kant to the regress problem Kant eludes; and, second, it 
shows that Sellars grasps Kant’s evasion and ―rescues‖ Kant for the sake 
of his (Kant’s) putatively ―pragmatist‖ intent (if, indeed, that is the right 
way to read Kant—which I very much doubt). But if you grant Brandom’s 
reading of Sellars’s reading of Kant’s pragmatist intent, then you may also 
hold (with Brandom) that Wittgenstein’s analysis of ―rule-following‖ has 
penetrated the extravagances of the Kantian doctrine even more 
powerfully: that it has demonstrated that Kant could not meet the regress 
threat if it arose, that Wittgenstein has completely disarmed it, and, as a 
 
 
 20. See BRANDOM, MAKING IT EXPLICIT, supra note 14, at 20. 
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consequence, that Brandom is its beneficiary. The argument is a complete 
non sequitur. First, because if Wittgenstein’s analysis is valid, the 
Sellarsian and Brandomian answers are irrelevant; and, second, because 
Brandom actually rejects Wittgenstein’s account of language games, 
which accords with Wittgenstein’s own resolution of the regress issue. I’m 
persuaded that Brandom goes completely wrong in his reading of 
Wittgenstein—hence, also, in assessing the philosophical plausibility of 
both Sellars’s and his own inferentialist programs.  
I take Brandom’s mistaken reading here to account for his mistaken 
explanation of Wittgenstein’s supposed confusion, in the Investigations, in 
claiming that language ―has no downtown‖: that is, that we cannot count 
on ―some more primitive sort of practical propriety‖ (Brandom’s own 
phrasing, cited above) beyond the explicit rules of discursive inference to 
solve the regress problem—something, say, akin to Sellars’s 
extraordinarily puzzling (pregnant) summary: ―[t]he mode of existence of 
a rule is as a generalization written in flesh and blood, or nerve and sinew, 
rather than in pen and ink.‖21 Sellars, you realize, deliberately replaces 
Kant’s explicitly transcendental account of rules with his own postulated 
rules ―written in flesh and blood‖—genealogically contrived—in order, 
first, to disallow any apriorism in the ―pragmatic‖ replacement and, 
second, to avoid the need for any completely explicit or determinate rules 
his own glimpse of inferentialism might require in order to end the regress 
threat.
22
 There’s no doubt that Sellars believes a suitable ―propositional‖ 
equivalent can always be provided for such ―implicit‖ rules (in flesh and 
blood), but he never explains how that might be done in any demonstrably 
valid way. It’s there, of course, that Brandom suggests his sort of 
algorithmic, AI-simulative constructivism to fill the gap the regress yields. 
The idea seems possible in the abstract, but Brandom advances no 
reason to think he can meet the actual challenge of Wittgenstein’s 
treatment of the inferential complexities of language games in any 
evidentially pertinent sense. There’s the failure of Brandom’s quarrel with 
Wittgenstein, on two counts, perhaps three. Brandom ―does not see‖ that 
Wittgenstein is clear that if determinate rules are needed to end the regress 
problem, then the project is hopeless. He also fails to see that the regress 
 
 
 21. WILFRID SELLARS, Language, Rules and Behavior, in PURE PRAGMATICS AND POSSIBLE 
WORLDS: THE EARLY ESSAYS OF WILFRID SELLARS 129, 139 (Jeffery F. Sicha ed., 1980) [hereinafter 
SELLARS, PURE PRAGMATICS]. For Brandom’s extraordinarily problematic account of Wittgenstein’s 
conception of language, see BRANDOM, SAYING AND DOING, supra note 5, at 41–43; on his intended 
solution of the regress problem, see id. at 69–97. 
 22. SELLARS, PURE PRAGMATICS, supra note 21. 
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threat can be stalemated without denying that we may be entitled to claim 
that we’re actually ―following the rule‖ even when we cannot 
convincingly demonstrate that we are. Finally, Brandom neglects the fact 
that the regress problem (and its resolution) affects all of our language 
games and our sense of the very structure of natural language use (the 
point of Brandom’s worry about the lack of a ―downtown‖).  
Let me put the point a little more bluntly, to prepare the ground for the 
final lesson encumbering Kant. It’s true that when Wittgenstein offers his 
well-known examples of how to continue a given arithmetic series 
according to a seemingly straightforward rule—―add 2,‖ for example—
which nevertheless is contested by fluent speakers who seem to interpret 
the rule differently but cannot provide a further rule to bring such 
differences to an end, he himself ventures a specimen admission (which 
Brandom misreads) that entitles him to affirm in good conscience that he 
was ―following the rule‖ and still saw nothing wrong in how he 
proceeded.
23
 At the same time, Wittgenstein shows just how all of us may 
reach a point at which nothing can be gained by adding another enabling 
or irenic rule: 
When I obey a rule, [Wittgenstein says, frustrated, let us suppose, 
by the disbelief of others he thought believed he was following the 
rule acknowledged,] I do not choose. 
I obey the rule blindly.
24
 
The sense of this is that we may be, and are not infrequently, obliged to 
fall back to the fluency of responding within the normal practices, 
expectations, and tolerances belonging to our way of life. If you read 
Wittgenstein this way, you see that he is certainly Kant’s opponent. The 
linkage between norms and rules cannot be entirely determinate or 
assuredly uniform; and, although it is not incorrect (Wittgenstein assures 
us) to say we are following a rule in making the judgment we make, we 
are always close to being unable to advance an interpretation of the rule 
we say we’re following that will assuredly be recognized to fix 
determinately and uniquely the correct way to respond. The upshot is that 
the Kantian model (in the first Critique), applied to the world of practical 
life, cannot be counted on to solve the regress problem: the very admission 
of rules of application (in effect, interpretations of the rules to be applied) 
simply extends the regress problem. Sellars’s seemingly helpful 
 
 
 23. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 19, § 219. 
 24. Id.  
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improvement is no improvement at all. But if the problem arises for 
Sellars, it arises just as forcefully for Brandom; and if we abandon Kant’s 
apriorism, the Kantian formula will also be caught in the same bramble. 
Of course, Wittgenstein resolves the regress problem by admitting his own 
form of stalemate, the consensus of an insuperable stalemate—which, in 
context, is not unlike invoking verdicts rather than mere judgments. If we 
apply the argument to Kant, abandoning apriorism, then Kant’s answer 
will be no better than Sellars’s or Brandom’s. 
IV 
Before I turn to Kant’s actual texts, however, I should like to collect 
some general findings about the regress problem that help to fix certain 
strategic aspects of its eccentric significance. For one thing, although it 
seems to be a relatively freestanding problem that can arise in nearly every 
philosophical system, its variant forms tend to make it difficult to argue 
from the vantage of one version of the problem to another. For instance, 
the form it takes in Kant’s account is inextricably qualified by Kant’s 
transcendentalism; whereas the form it takes in Wittgenstein’s 
Investigations is profoundly opposed to any apriorist powers. We learn, by 
comparing arguments, that we cannot quite isolate the seemingly formal 
problem from its embedding local strategies. 
Hence, the regress problem tends to take very different forms, in that it 
is thoroughly endentured to the higher-order holist convictions that it 
reflects and draws its strength from, which cannot be easily (or at all) 
translated into the idiom of opposing theories—in which, very possibly, its 
own form of regress cannot even arise. Thus, Wittgenstein’s approach to 
the regress problem, in the Investigations, is said to ―defeat,‖ hands down, 
the solution of the regress problem in Kant’s first Critique. Nevertheless, 
in the Critique itself, the problem appears to be no more than a minor 
nuisance and, in the Investigations, it finally has no place at all. So the 
force of Wittgenstein’s implied argument is a function of a contest that 
arises properly (if it arises at all) at the higher-order level at which the 
problem itself ceases to be a problem for the partisans of either doctrine; 
and yet the higher-order commitments remain in continual contest. 
The Wittgenstein of the Investigations simply is the implacable 
opponent of the kind of facultative privilege Kant embraces. And yet, 
strangely, the force of Wittgenstein’s argument (at the point of 
confrontation) bids fair to subvert (or weaken) the thrust of Kant’s 
apriorism. (Brandom reads Wittgenstein as instructing Kant, and Kant as 
having anticipated Wittgenstein. Nevertheless, in grasping Wittgenstein’s 
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incomparable reflection, we sense the unsuitability of Kant’s supposed 
response.) Because it exposes in its clever way what has been repeatedly 
exposed respecting Kant, namely the plain fact that Kant fails to provide 
compelling grounds for adopting his particular version of apriorism. This 
fact, of course, may itself be displayed in the form of a regress argument 
of its own that Kant could not obviate by merely invoking his treatment of 
the problem in the first Critique. I call these higher-order, more-or-less 
holist, ―rationally instinctive‖ conceptual visions—which are effectively 
incapable of being demonstrably validated or invalidated—
―metaphilosophical cultures,‖ if I may name an oxymoron thus. They 
seem too deep or too huge to be open to any reasonably decisive 
argumentative strategy; and yet they profoundly affect our choice of 
arguments. 
Certainly, it’s the a priori assurance of the unity of reason that Kant 
relies on to keep all matters of freedom and causality fixedly bound to one 
another, so that the transcendental necessities said to be binding on science 
and morality separately are known to come from the same source and thus 
to sustain the immense force of Kant’s entire Critique. But it has nothing 
in common, at that higher-order level of reflection, with whatever may be 
the grounds on which Wittgenstein’s Investigations is thought to be 
coherent and viable. Is there a disjunctive argument on which to settle the 
seeming claims in dispute between these two positions? 
Wittgenstein’s Lebensform is hardly explored at all, except (perhaps) 
negatively, for the sake of countering any and all philosophical fixities of 
the kind that may be expected to approach those favored by Kant or Frege, 
who certainly would not agree with one another. Hence—a second 
lesson—the study of the regress argument proceeds along an intertwined 
continuum that inseparably links the would-be precision of dependent 
philosophical strategies and the stubborn, higher-order indemonstrability 
(not usually characterized as vagueness) of our metaphilosophical 
―abductions‖ (rational instincts, to speak with Peirce) that are quite 
inflexible, often also quite convincing, though they cannot rightly issue 
determinate claims in their own name. They are inflexible in the plain 
sense that they come as close as any doctrine (that we may advance) to our 
most abiding, deepest, most ultimate convictions regarding the way the 
world is: flux versus fixity, for instance. In this sense, I appear to myself 
as a partisan of the flux regarding reason in the world; Kant is a partisan of 
the fixity and unity of an adequate form of an encompassing reason. I see 
no prospect of recovering Kant’s sort of confidence in our deeply historied 
world. 
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I’ve already mentioned what may serve as a third lesson. The regress 
argument signifies—or should signify—to thinkers like Kant and Frege 
the irrelevance of skepticism. To others, like the Wittgenstein of the 
Investigations, the seeming stalemate of the regress argument signifies no 
more than an error, the effect of confusing the limited use (if admitted at 
all) of certain criteria, inferential patterns, analytic strategies, explicit rules 
and principles we (mistakenly) suppose we must invariably rely on, if we 
are to understand our form of life at all. The regress dissolves for 
Wittgenstein when we understand the limits of the explicit devices (those 
we’ve managed to regularize for extremely well-worn discursive routines) 
whenever we come up against puzzle cases that can be effectively resolved 
only by consensual improvisation. (Such cases normally fall within the 
boundaries of our actual practice and custom.) 
Kant doesn’t blink at all at the seeming fatal brilliance of the regress 
argument and Wittgenstein simply turns the challenge into the analysis of 
a common misdescription of the actual resilience of our language games. 
My own suggestion is that we should admit the merit and limitation of 
both sorts of challenge and response (according to the instructions of their 
champions), because, at best, skepticism is a tolerable shadow cast by the 
sufficient light of convincing answers of either sort (if they are indeed 
convincing). The point remains that the dispute may have consequences 
for what I’ve called our metaphilosophical cultures as well as for our 
strategies of philosophical argument. I see no general or singular 
advantage here. There is no ultimate victory to be had about all the forms 
of skepticism. But lesser philosophical arguments do indeed count and 
have consequences that may shake our deeper argumentative cultures. 
And, of course, we must not forget that neither Sellars nor Brandom is 
entitled to the stalemate just proposed (if that is what it is). Because both 
are committed to a form of inferentialism (Sellars only incipiently, 
Brandom more ambitiously) that claims to have bested (or to have shown 
the way to resolve) the regress problem itself. All that’s missing are the 
arguments! 
Given these considerations, the regress argument may be deemed to 
yield two distinct contests: one, the confrontation between Brandom (or 
Sellars) and Kant, focused on the assumption that the Pittsburgh School 
retires Kant’s transcendentalism without disallowing the transcendental 
question to assume an a posteriori form; the other, the implied 
confrontation between Wittgenstein and Kant regarding the effect of a 
strong advocacy or rejection of apriorism (the determinacy of apriorist 
rules); and, thereupon, the effect of Wittgenstein’s posteriorist option on 
the Pittsburgh solution. 
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There is, of course, a salient site in Kant’s first and third Critiques, 
different in important ways from one another, that signals Kant’s 
awareness of how the regress problem may be posed for his own 
transcendental approach. Though, to be candid, Kant never goes far 
enough in reconsidering his own fundamental options. For example, Kant 
never risks the option of the operative (descriptive and explanatory) 
compatibility of causality and freedom or, indeed, the ineluctable role of 
causality itself in the formation of whatever we take to be the powers of 
human freedom—his most systematic, most powerful categories, which he 
always treats disjunctively. I’d say it was clear, admitting apriorism, that, 
from Kant’s point of view, the regress problem was more a nuisance than 
a philosophical worry. Although the difference between Kant’s two 
passages (actually, the difference between the two Critiques) more than 
suggests the pressing importance of a much, much wider confrontation, if, 
within the scope of apriorism, we distinguish between the mere ―power‖ 
of applying rules provisionally conceded to be given (even if a priori) in 
subsuming individual cases under universal rules, from the seemingly 
inchoate power of actually deciding afresh whether entrenched runs of 
accepted categories are ample or flexible enough to be extended (without 
distortion) to judgments regarding hitherto neglected or unfamiliar 
phenomena. 
But arguments of this kind clearly put the cart before the horse. This is 
so because, first, it’s inherently uncertain whether, even with regard to the 
most orderly parts of nature, the would-be laws of nature behave in the 
way Kant supposes (I don’t believe they do).25 Second, Kant never risks 
re-examining the possible distortion of his disjunctive, fundamental 
separation between the domains of nature and freedom—surely, there’s a 
form of causality in cultural life and historical phenomena compatible with 
human freedom. Third, in grasping the necessity of revising his account of 
the faculty of judgment in order to accommodate the deviant features 
uncovered in explaining the conceptual logic of taking aesthetic pleasure 
in works of art and of supporting teleological judgments, Kant almost 
completely neglects the much larger and more challenging continent of 
culturally artifactual (or artifactually transformed) ―things‖ that cannot 
possibly be subsumed under the categories of what he intends by the 
inclusive space of ―nature‖: selves, artworks, histories, human actions, 
institutions, interpretable meanings incarnate in phenomena coherently 
 
 
 25. For a particularly promising brief, see NANCY CARTWRIGHT, THE DAPPLED WORLD: A 
STUDY OF THE BOUNDARIES OF SCIENCE (1999). 
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manifesting (at one and the same time) both physical and semiotic 
features, and so on. And, fourth, it’s simply counterintuitive to suppose 
that the relationship between the cognitive powers of the ―understanding‖ 
and the run of things that belong to nature—or, of whatever more extended 
cognitive competences rightly range over the rest of the cognizable things 
we admit depend on what we loosely call perception and experience—can 
be settled once and for all by any a priori assurances about the scope of 
such sources or of what we should mean by the enabling rules by which 
those faculties are said to function.
26
 
V 
These last considerations (viewed from the vantage of the third 
Critique) catch up the premature closure of Kant’s opening remarks in the 
Introduction in the Second Book of the Transcendental Analytic (of the 
first Critique): ―If the understanding in general is explained as the faculty 
of rules, [Kant says,] then the power of judgment is the faculty of 
subsuming under rules, i.e., of determining whether something stands 
under a given rule . . . or not[, that is, a determining judgment: sometimes 
also called a determinant judgment].‖27 Here, the power of judgment is 
completely subordinate, as application, to the a priori work of the 
understanding, which, by providing the very concepts that govern the 
whole of nature, provides the concepts by which whatever is empirically 
encountered is thereby rendered intelligible within the space of nature. In 
 
 
 26. I’m hinting here, of course, that no small adjustment could possibly save Kant’s Critical 
project. He saw the threat to his theory of judgment and his analysis of enabling rules—and therefore 
his stonewalling on the regress issue. But Kant could not go further without revisiting the self-
deceptive fixities of his own transcendentalism. There’s the rationale for reading Kant genealogically 
rather than in some merely textually constant way. In that sense, no matter how distressing it may be, 
Sellars and Brandom have ―the better of the argument‖ though not ―better arguments.‖ 
 It would be easy to collect exemplary counterinstructions regarding each of the enumerated 
objections against Kant’s courageous and yet much too timid reopening of what we should mean by 
the powers of objective judgment, which, of course, can never disjoin cognitional function and the 
functional application of its supposedly enabling rules; nor, therefore, disjoin whatever reasonably 
belongs to the ―empirical‖ or ―phenomenological‖ resources of sensibility, perception, experience, 
feeling, intention and the like matching whatever we find impossible to resist acknowledging within 
our cognizable world. I offer only a token reminder: Ernst Cassirer goes very far in sketching how 
profoundly the third Critique must be widened beyond anything Kant was prepared to accommodate; 
but even he, for instance in the chapter on history in ERNST CASSIRER, AN ESSAY ON MAN: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO A PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN CULTURE (1944), stops dead in his tracks when it comes 
to admitting the compatibility between causality and freedom and the need for causal inquiries in the 
body of historical research compatible with freedom. There’s a mortal limitation there. 
 27. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 268 (Paul Guyer & Allen W. Wood eds. & 
trans., 1998) [hereinafter KANT, PURE REASON]. 
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the third Critique, however, in sections IV–V of the published 
Introduction, Kant considers the profound significance of the plain fact 
that, within the bounds of specifically human inquiry (not yet assuredly of 
nature), it may happen that ―only the particular is given, for which the 
universal is to be found,‖ in which case ―the power of judgment is [Kant 
says] merely reflecting [or reflective].‖28 
But then a huge no-man’s land is exposed by Kant, signaled but hardly 
exhausted by the mention of aesthetic and teleological judgment, of what 
may not fit at all within Kant’s conception of the domain of nature, and yet 
may persuade us that we are indeed examining part of the actual, 
cognizable world. I have no hesitation in suggesting that this will be seen 
to include the whole of what we now regard as the encultured human 
world: history, language, semiotic, action and agency, art, human purpose 
and reflection, custom and institutions, and the like. 
You have only to read the gymnastic account Kant gives us of the new-
found work of ―reflective judgment‖ to grasp the threat of the completely 
unresolved dilemma that now confronts Kant’s entire system—from 
which, I dare say, Kant simply shrinks. What Kant says here—beguilingly 
enough—shows the way to a fresh sense of the regress argument applied 
to his own Critiques, which he can no longer disarm by the devices of the 
first Critique. In one formulation, for instance, he says: 
The reflecting power of judgment . . . can only give itself . . . a 
transcendental principle as a law, . . . cannot derive it from 
anywhere else (for then it would be the determining power of 
judgment), nor can it prescribe it to nature: for reflection on the 
laws of nature is directed by nature, and nature is not directed by the 
conditions in terms of which we attempt to develop a concept of it 
that is in this regard entirely contingent.
29
 
Just so! 
 
 
 28. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF THE POWER OF JUDGMENT 67 (Paul Guyer ed., Paul Guyer & 
Eric Matthews trans., 2000) [hereinafter KANT, POWER OF JUDGMENT]. I’ve intruded the usual 
alternative English expressions for the two functions of the faculty of judgment in the third Critique to 
avoid terminological confusion. Kant’s point, of course, is that, in the successful formulation of the a 
priori concepts by which we understand nature, both the universal concept and the particular sensory 
datum must be ―given.‖ The sense of the phrasing preceding the line just cited makes this clear. Kant 
goes on to say: ―The determining power of judgment under universal transcendental laws, given by the 
understanding, merely subsumes; the law is sketched out for it a priori, and it is therefore unnecessary 
for it to think of a law for itself in order to be able to subordinate the particular in nature to the 
universal.‖ Id. I have benefited considerably from the analysis of the third Critique in ANGELICA 
NUZZO, KANT AND THE UNITY OF REASON (2005). 
 29. KANT, POWER OF JUDGMENT, supra note 28, at 67. 
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But if—as I anticipate—the new domain (to be searched by reflective 
judgment) proves resistant to universal causal laws, or requires a notion of 
causality (engaging and affecting agency) that cannot be reduced to the 
causality of Kant’s conception of nature, or invites interpretive and 
explanatory concepts that hybridize causality and significance (meanings, 
say, or symbolic or semiotic or hermeneutic import), or confirms the 
compatibility of causality and freedom, or rejects any and all simplistic or 
Kantian-like logical or methodological disjunctions between the natural 
and human sciences or between theoretical and practical reason (or, 
between the faculties of understanding and reason, or even between 
empiricism and Critical philosophy), what then? The entire Critical 
undertaking would be put at instant risk and Kant’s doctrine of the rules of 
judgment would instantly restore a plausible target for a kind of 
Wittgensteinian demolition. Kant and Brandom would fail together! I say 
Kant’s admission betrays the fact that he cannot know the bounds and 
limits of nature: he cannot know, therefore, what perception and historical 
discovery may yet disclose; he cannot know what is transcendentally 
required by our own would-be knowledge of nature. 
Kant’s essential questions, including the regress question, are normally 
restricted to transcendental matters. But, in the third Critique, if I 
understand it right, that’s no longer possible because Kant concedes that 
we may be able to contrive ―empirical‖ concepts for what we encounter 
(let us say, laxly, in experience, in order that we need not be forced to 
decide prematurely among the resources of phenomenal and 
phenomenological perception and experience). Mere empirical judgments 
(the ―power‖ of judgment in the empirically dependent sense) remain, of 
course, bound by the constraints of what Kant famously calls ―mother 
wit‖: ―[t]he lack of the power of judgment [in the applied sense] is [Kant 
adds] that which is properly called stupidity, and such a failing is not to be 
helped.‖30 But now, even that certainty may be thrown into disarray. This 
is because given the new office of the faculty of judgment, it may always 
be possible, retrospectively, to cast doubt on some presumed universality 
(for instance, affecting all the laws of nature that are said to determine, a 
priori, the rules of judgment by which the understanding functions). In 
that event, the problematic standing of Kant’s apriorist claims (as distinct 
from mere transcendental inquiries) outflanks the assurances of mother 
wit. Admit that much, and the apodictic spirit of apriorism threatens to 
appear to be no more than a rhetorical flourish. 
 
 
 30. KANT, PURE REASON, supra note 27, at 268. 
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The regress argument now seems to yield three distinct contests: one, 
the confrontation between Brandom (or Sellars) and Kant himself, focused 
on the assumption that the Pittsburgh School retires Kant’s 
transcendentalism without disallowing the transcendental question to take 
an a posteriori form; a second, the implied confrontation between 
Wittgenstein and Kant regarding the effect of a strong advocacy, or 
rejection, of apriorism, without disallowing reference to rules of judgment 
or rational inference; and, a third, the dispute between the Kant of the first 
and third Critiques, on the assumption that their views are profoundly 
incompatible or committed to opposed possibilities that could never 
recover the assurances of the first Critique. In this sense, Kant is 
ineluctably drawn by his own reflections into the heart of our own (and 
Brandom’s) quarrels, which he might have thought he could escape. 
Problems of the third kind drive the textualists themselves to genealogy. 
Wittgenstein may be interpreted as taking Kant to be committed to the 
evidentiary form of the regress argument, since the transcendental issue, 
Kant acknowledges, must, in making a priori inquiries, proceed in some 
measure a posteriori, whether one makes apriorist claims or not. Kant 
actually says: 
[S]ince universal laws of nature have their ground in our 
understanding, which prescribes them to nature (although only in 
accordance with the universal concept of it as nature), the particular 
empirical laws, in regard to that which is left undetermined in them 
by the former, must be considered in terms of the sort of unity they 
would have if an understanding (even if not ours) had likewise 
given them for the sake of our faculty of cognition, in order to make 
possible a system of experience in accordance with particular laws 
of nature. Not as if in this way such an understanding must really be 
assumed (for it is only the reflecting power of judgment for which 
this idea serves as a principle, for reflecting, not for determining); 
rather this faculty thereby gives a law only to itself, and not to 
nature.
31
 
But this, of course, leaves open the grave possibility that Kant’s apriorist 
claims may themselves be no more than undefeated conjectures. In fact, it 
leaves open the possibility that a dyed-in-the-wool Kantian might either 
deform our account of ―things‖ that simply do not belong to Kant’s 
conception of nature, in order to remain loyal to Kant’s executive 
 
 
 31. KANT, POWER OF JUDGMENT, supra note 28, at 67–68. 
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conception. Such a Kantian might also fail to see that there may be things 
that meet minimal conditions of ―nature‖ without being reducible to them, 
or fail to grasp that our ―empirical‖ concepts may be as good as (or better 
than) what adhering to the (supposedly invariant) conceptual constraints of 
nature might produce, so that, mistakenly, such conjectures are simply 
discarded. 
Let me close this discussion with a final reference to Kant’s third 
Critique, which, if my argument survives, yields the somewhat startling 
conclusion that Kant must confront the regress issue in the most 
fundamental way—and therefore, Wittgenstein’s counterargument as 
well—though the regress issue may not, earlier, have seemed as pertinent 
to Kant’s position as to Sellars’s or Brandom’s. I’m referring to Kant’s 
general hint, in the Preface to the first edition (1790), introducing his 
innovative conception of judgment as ―a special [third] faculty of 
cognition‖: 
It can . . . easily be inferred [he says] from the nature of the power 
of judgment (the correct use of which is so necessary and generally 
required that nothing other than this very faculty is meant by the 
name ―sound understanding‖) that great difficulties must be 
involved in finding a special principle for it (which it must contain 
in itself a priori, for otherwise, it would not, as a special faculty of 
cognition, be exposed even to the most common critique), which 
nevertheless must not be derived from concepts a priori; for they 
belong to the understanding, and the power of judgment is 
concerned only with their application. It therefore has to provide a 
concept itself, through which no thing is actually cognized, but 
which only serves as a rule for it, but not as an objective rule to 
which it can conform its judgment, since for that yet another power 
of judgment would be required in order to be able to decide whether 
it is a case of the rule or not.
32
 
I think this would have been the mate of Kant’s remark about mother wit; 
but Kant has now effectively offered his opponents a basis on which to 
call into question the venture of his entire system, as I’ve tried to show. So 
that now, it affords a perfectly legitimate ground on which to postpone 
(indefinitely) the confirmation of any proposed apriorist concepts: they 
may all be empirical conjectures not yet shown to be true (and perhaps 
never needing to be shown to be true), and perhaps never even provided 
 
 
 32. Id. at 56–57.  
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with any viable or compelling principle or rule for deciding the issue; also, 
without ever showing or being able to show that cognition must be 
confined to what Kant calls ―nature.‖ Intimations of dark matter? Hardly. 
But surely some unraveling. Where will it end? 
The passage just cited is itself a plain admission that the presumptive 
competence, certitude, and scope of the understanding (Verstand) are 
completely conjectural. This is not merely because there’s more to 
―reality‖ that we would want to include in a larger ―nature‖ than the first 
Critique could possibly accommodate (in accord with its announced table 
of categories), but because the Critique is inherently incapable of 
demonstrating (as any concession to genealogical practice would demand) 
that its apriorist claims—regarding, say, the right analysis of the supposed 
disjunction between causality and freedom, as well as the analysis of the 
supposed non-conceptual homogeneity of space and time—could 
conceivably have foreseen (or convincingly have met) the bearing of all 
possible (still unknown) empirical discoveries (or the transcendental 
conjectures they may be said to yield, pertinently). Strict apriorist 
universality and the historicity of thought and experience appear to be 
irreconcilably opposed in epistemological contexts. 
These concessions also suggest that we may conjecture (in the 
genealogical mode I’m recommending and have been exploring) that 
David Hume could easily have been (or could have been taken to be, by us 
as well as a more sanguine Kant) a quasi-Critical thinker—perhaps even a 
―transcendental empiricist‖—who would have seen at once that the a 
priori must (faute de mieux) proceed a posteriori, for instance in positing 
causality as providing a rational (and reasonable) sense of the 
―transcendental‖ import of salient, regular sequences of observable 
events.
33
 The entire reflection, I daresay, confirms a deeper continuity 
among the ―Kantians‖ of Brandom’s choosing than he affirms; and 
confirms, as a consequence, the strengthened force of the genealogical 
objection I’ve advanced in favor of superseding any merely textualist 
reading of Kant’s transcendentalism. These are the deeper findings I draw 
from the regress problem. I take them to accord best with a historicized 
reading of philosophical pragmatism—but I shall not attempt to argue the 
matter here. 
 
 
 33. For a brief discussion of the matter, see ALLISON, supra note 4, at 26–27, 246–47. Allison’s 
discussion is influenced by that of LEWIS WHITE BECK, ESSAYS ON KANT AND HUME (1978). See also 
DAVID HUME, A TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE (David Fate Norton & Mary J. Norton eds., 2000); 
KANT, PURE REASON, supra note 27, at 303–04 (second analogy of experience). 
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